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JUSTICES HARLAN AND BLACK REVISITED: THE
EMERGING DISPUTE BETVEEN JUSTICE
O'CONNOR AND JUSTICE SCALIA OVER
UNENUMERATED
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
DAVID B. ANDERS*
INTRODUCTION

"Justice O'Connor's assertion... cannot be taken seriously."'I Justice
Scalia made this statement four years ago, criticizing Justice O'Connor's
refusal to reconsider the Court's recognition of a fundamental right to
abortion. Justice Scalia may equally apply this critique to Justice
O'Connor's most recent theoretical statements on that fundamental
rights issue. In PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,2 O'Connor surprised many
observers3 by joining an opinion upholding the fundamental right to
abortion4 that the Court first recognized in Roe v. Wade. Five Justices
wrote opinions in Casey.6 The joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter and the opinion of Justice Scalia consider the theory
behind the derivation of unenumerated fundamental rights.7 These opinions enable analysis of the constitutional theories of Justices Scalia and
O'Connor regarding unenumerated fundamental rights derived from the
* I would like to thank Professor James E. Fleming for his insights and comments
on earlier drafts of this Note, which was originally written for his seminar on constitutional theory.
1. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
2. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
3. See Ronald Dworkin, The Center Holds, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Aug. 13, 1992, at
29 [hereinafter Dworkin, Center Holds]; Linda Greenhouse, Moderates on Court Defy
Predictions,N.Y. Times, July 5, 1992, § 4, at 1.
4. See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2804.
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter issued a joint opinion that represented
the holding of the Court. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2803. Justices Stevens and Blackmun
each issued opinions that agreed with the joint opinion's affirmation of Roe, but dissented
to the restrictions allowed. See &L at 2838, 2843. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia authored opinions, joined by Justice White, Justice Thomas, and each other, which
concurred with the restrictions allowed, but dissented to the affirmation of Roe. See id. at
2855, 2873.
7. An "unenumerated" fundamental right is a right that is not explicitly granted in
the Constitution, but is so basic as to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 488 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). But see Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated
Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381, 390 (1992)
[hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights] (arguing that all rights are enumeratedbut at different levels of abstraction). Examples of possible unenumerated fundamental
rights are the right to abortion, the right to homosexual association, the right to die, and
the right to privacy.
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Constitutional scholars considered both Justices O'Connor and Scalia
judicial conservatives at the time of their confirmations.' Both Justices
apparently supported an originalist approach' ° to the derivation of
unenumerated fundamental rights from the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1' In Casey, however, Justice O'Connor 2 recognized the fundamental right to abortion.
One of two events may have caused Justice O'Connor to recognize this
fundamental right. Possibly, Justice O'Connor shifted constitutional theories, adopting the fundamental rights theory of constitutional interpretation. If so, then Justices O'Connor and Scalia, two Reagan appointees
and political conservatives, may suddenly have become theoretical opposites in their approaches to fundamental rights issues. A second explanation for Justice O'Connor's ruling may be her attitude toward stare
decisis. Justice O'Connor's dispute with Justice Scalia may not be based
on competing theories, but on competing conceptions of the proper use of
precedent. This Note will trace the theoretical evolution of Justices

Scalia and O'Connor in the field of unenumerated fundamental rights
derived from the Due Process Clause and will examine their contrasting
attitudes toward precedent.
Part I of this Note briefly explains two major theories of constitutional
interpretation: originalism and fundamental rights. Part II examines
these Justices' past and current theoretical beliefs by analyzing their writ8. The Due Process Clause reads, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. See Robert E. Riggs, Justice O'Connor: A First Term Appraisal, 1983 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1, 5-7 (1983); Richard Nagareda, Comment, The Appellate Jurisprudenceof Justice
Antonin Scalia, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 705, 705 (1987).
10. Originalism is one of the major theories of constitutional interpretation. Its major
tenets include reliance on the text of the Constitution, support of the Framers' intent, and
deference to legislatures. See infra Part I.A.
Another major theory of constitutional interpretation which opposes originalism is the
fundamental rights approach. This view holds that the Constitution protects rights other
than those explicitly enumerated in the text. See infra Part I.B.
11. This Note will focus on rights that are potentially derived from the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not from other sources. See, e.g., Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (expansion of Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures to include eavesdropping); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958) (extension of First Amendment to include a right of association). The
constitutional theories described below, originalism and fundamental rights, also apply to
enumerated but vague rights such as the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment.
12. A group of Justices, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, issued the Court's holding
in the form of a joint opinion. In a joint opinion, no single Justice writes the opinion.
Rather, several Justices collaborate, combining similar, but separate, views into one opinion. This Note frequently refers to the opinion as "O'Connor's" and assumes that
O'Connor supports all of the views expressed in the joint opinion. The Court last issued a
joint opinion in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ. concurring in part, dissenting in part). See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term: Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 119 (1992) [hereinafter Sullivan, Foreword].
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ings and opinions. This section focuses on Justice O'Connor's possible
shift from originalism to fundamental rights. Part III suggests the implications of these Justices' contrasting theories by analyzing the key differentiating factors that will likely guide their future fundamental rights
decisions. This section compares the O'Connor/Scalia dispute with the
Harlan/Black dispute of a generation ago and focuses on the role that
precedent plays in each Justices' evaluation of fundamental rights cases.
This Note concludes that, though they may diverge theoretically, these
Justices remain politically conservative and, therefore, may not continue
on opposite sides of the fundamental rights battleground. Justice
O'Connor's views, as expressed in the Casey joint opinion, however, create speculation
that her approach to fundamental rights issues may be
13
changing.
I.

ORIGINALISM VERSUS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Two major theories of constitutional interpretation are "originalism"
and "fundamental rights." 4 Inasmuch as many Justices have adopted
one of these two theories, the arguments each theory presents are crucial
in the debate over potential unenumerated fundamental rights.' 5
A.

Originalism

Generally, originalists believe that the Constitution protects only those
rights specifically enumerated in the text of the Constitution or those
rights that the Framers intended to protect.' 6 Specific supporters, however, have slightly different versions of originalism.17
13. With the election of Bill Clinton, and his promise to appoint liberal judges to the
Supreme Court, O'Connor's possible shift has even greater impact on the overall balance
of the Court.
14. See supra note 10.
15. The theories of some current Supreme Court Justices are apparent. Clear
originalists when interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
include Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and White (for White, see Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J.,
dissenting)). Fundamental rights theorists include Justices Blackmun, see Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2843 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Stevens, see Casey, 112 S. Ct.
at 2839 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). After the Casey opinion,
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter may have joined the fundamental rights theorists, but this is not yet clear. Justice Thomas's theory is still developing. Before joining
the Court, he espoused natural law. See Clarence Thomas, The HigherLaw Background
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 63 (1989). In his first term, however, he frequently sided with Scalia and
supported an originalist view. See Greenhouse, supra note 3, at 1.
16. See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary (1977); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990).
17. An example of the slight differences among originalists is Robert Bork and Chief
Justice William Rehnquist's difference as to whose intentions matter. Bork believes that
judges should seek the original meaning of the Constitution as the ratifies understood it.
See Bork, supra note 16, at 144-45. Bork holds this view because he sees law as a public
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As a group, originalists do not oppose fundamental rights per se.
Rather, they believe that the Constitution protects some fundamental
rights and liberties, namely those specifically enumerated in the Constitution. For instance, while originalism forbids judges from creating rights,
the theory also bars judges from destroying constitutionally or legislatively created rights."8 To do so would either violate the explicit words
of the Constitution or encroach upon the power of legislatures and the
people.' 9 Nor are originalists against individual or minority rights. In
fact, originalists believe that the Court should defend individual or minority rights when there is explicit textual support. "A merely temporary majoritarian groundswell should not abrogate some individual
liberty truly protected by the Constitution."2 0 In other words, shifts in
public opinion should not change the meaning of the Constitution.2
In addition to protecting enumerated rights, a second basic originalist
tenet is that, in determining which rights it will protect, the Court must
act as a legal, not a political, body. Originalists stress this limited role for
the judiciary because the Court historically has made poor decisions
when acting as a legislative, policy-creating branch.2 2 Accordingly,
originalists view our governmental structure as a representative democracy.23 Therefore, when the Court "legislates," it ignores "the nature of
political value judgments in a democratic society."24 Moral views should
become law only through the legislative process or by constitutional
amendment. 2 5
In order to achieve the originalist goal of acting as a legal, rather than
a political, institution, the Court should neutrally derive and define legal
act; the search is for objective, not subjective, intent. "All that counts is how the words
used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time." Id. at 144.
Unlike Bork, Chief Justice Rehnquist believes that the source of fundamental rights
must be the text or the Framers'intentions. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a
Living Constitution,54 Tex. L. Rev. 693, 695 (1976). Though Rehnquist does not specifically state why he uses the Framers' intent, as opposed to that of the ratifiers, presumably
it is because the Framers authored the Constitution. The theories of other originalists
may differ in some minor respects including how rigidly to abide by the words of the text,
how to deal with vague passages of the text, and what political results are desired. See,
e.g., Berger, supra note 16, at 1-20; Hugo L. Black, A Constitutional Faith 23-42 (1968);
Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional 4djudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988).
18. See Bork, supra note 16, at 147.
19. See id.
20. Rehnquist, supra note 17, at 697 (emphasis added).
21. See id. at 696-97; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2865 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
22. See Rehnquist, supra note 17, at 700-01, 702-03 (using Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905) and Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) as examples of Court
failures when acting as a political body).
23. See infra note 124 (defining representative democracy).
24. Rehnquist, supra note 17, at 704.
25. See id. at 705; see also Sullivan, Foreword,supra note 12, at 58 (defining "rules" as
a legal directive that confines the decision-maker to facts, leaving arbitrary and subjective
value choices for others).
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principles.2 6 This neutral approach to decision-making forces judges to
rely on the text of the Constitution as originally understood. Judges
should not substitute personal values for
the dictates of the text itself or
27
the original understanding of the text.
Originalists recognize that some constitutional provisions were
broadly framed. Where the text itself does not clearly indicate whether a
fundamental right is protected, originalists take an historical approach,
analyzing the Framers' or ratifiers' intent. Originalists look at the
thoughts and practices of people at the time of the adoption of the constitutional section in question.2 8
This reliance on history, however, can lead to politically unpalatable
results. Therefore, some originalists, such as Justice Scalia, leave themselves an escape hatch by labeling themselves "faint-hearted" originalists.29 These faint-hearted originalists still favor an historical approach
to interpreting vague constitutional provisions. However, they simply
modify this element in cases involving potentially outrageous results.
For example, according to Scalia, public flogging was not historically
considered cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.3" Today, however, a decision that allowed such an activity would
be considered a travesty of justice. Therefore, faint-hearted originalists
can bar flogging, and other activities that society would consider outrageous, while claiming adherence to their doctrine.3
Summarizing the originalist position, an adherence to the original understanding of the Constitution is the only method of interpretation that
preserves the Constitution, separation of powers, and the liberties of the
people because it deprives judges of unwarranted power.32 For the Court
to protect rights that are not in the text of the 33
Constitution "is a formula
for an end run around popular government."
B. FundamentalRights
The major theory competing with originalism is the theory of fundamental rights. While many theorists argue different variations of the fundamental rights theory under various names, 34 all variations have
26. See Bork, supra note 16, at 146.
27. See id. at 146-53.
28. See id. at 149; Rehnquist, supra note 17, at 697, 699-700. For example, Rehnquist
notes that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment designed it to remedy past
problems, not to solve future problems, so the Court should not use that amendment to
create new rights. See id. at 700.
29. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L Rev. 849, 864
(1989).
30. See iL at 861.
31. See id. at 861-62.
32. See Bork, supra note 16, at 159-60.
33. Rehnquist, supra note 17, at 706.
34. This theory has also been described by its detractors as nonconstructionism,
nonoriginalism, and noninterpretivism. See John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 1
(1980); Grover Rees III, Questionsfor Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hear-
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basically the same central premise: there are certain rights that are so

fundamental to liberty and equality that they must constrain the legislative process.3 5

This discussion will focus primarily on Ronald Dworkin's version of
the fundamental rights theory.3 6 Dworkin distinguishes his theory of
constitutional interpretation from originalism by explaining that he does
37 Rather, he simply
not ignore the Constitution, as originalists claim.
38
holds a different view of what the text requires.

First, Dworkin rejects the originalist view that the text is a list of specific conceptions-that the Constitution is a list of rights, protecting only
those rights specifically enumerated. 39 Instead, Dworkin believes that
the text consists of general moral concepts." Using the term "concepts,"

Dworkin believes that the Constitution's provisions contain broad language because the Framers' aim was to protect general principles, not
specific rights. The Framers' true intent, therefore, was to use abstract
terms in their abstract sense. 4 Applying his theory, Dworkin views
Casey as the triumph of his conception of what the Constitution is over
Rehnquist and Scalia's conception.42
Second, Dworkin believes that judges must interpret the abstract
clauses of the Constitution. Because the Bill of Rights consists of abstract principles, and our legal culture has designated judges as the interpreters of the Constitution, Dworkin argues that judges must have the
ings: Excluding the Constitution, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 913, 915 n.6 (1983); Scalia, supra note
29, at 852.
35. See, e.g., Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (1985) [hereinafter Dworkin, Matter of Principle]; Laurence
H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional
Choices (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 433 (1986).
36. This Note relies on Dworkin's theory because he is a prominent fundamental
rights theorist, see Robin West, The Supreme Court 1989 Term: Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 43, 46 (1990), and he has forcefully criticized theories
known as "originalism." See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Bork's Jurisprudence,57 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 657 (1990) [hereinafter Dworkin, Bork's Jurisprudence] (attacking Robert Bork's
conception of originalism).
37. See Bork, supra note 16, at 213-14.
38. See Dworkin, Bork's Jurisprudence,supra note 36, at 659.
39. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 134 (1977) [hereinafter Dworkin,
Taking Rights Seriously]; see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2853
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (accusing Chief Justice Rehnquist of construing personal liberty cases as establishing only a "laundry list" of rights); cf. id. at 2859 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (urging the Court to limit rights to
those specific ones already recognized).
40. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 39, at 134.
41. See Dworkin, UnenumeratedRights, supra note 7, at 386. Building on this distinction, Dworkin considers whether the term "unenumerated" fundamental rights, as
distinguished from "enumerated" rights, makes sense. He concludes that it is a "bogus"
distinction, as all rights are derived from the text; they simply vary in their level of abstraction. See id. at 381, 390. Originalists, then, use the term "unenumerated" rights to
"load the dice" against the fundamental rights theorists.
42. See Dworkin, Center Holds, supra note 3, at 29.
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power to elaborate what these principles mean.4 3 Therefore, it is proper
for judges to determine what specific rights exist within these general
principles, such as what rights are embodied in the term "liberty" in the
Due Process Clause.
Third, Dworkin establishes guidelines for judges to use in applying
legal and moral principles to abstract clauses. He argues that, in deciphering the Constitution's principles, judges must establish a moral and
political philosophy.' Further, judges should not vary their philosophies from case to case, randomly deciding which rights they wish to
enforce. Rather, they must base their decisions on established principles,
not on compromise or political accommodation.4' Also, judges should
have some reasoned basis for their conclusions. Therefore, their decisions should conform to the bulk of precedent. 4" Finally, a judge who
adopts a legal or moral principle must consistently apply it in other cases
he decides.4 7 Integrity is crucial in justifying results.
In summary, Dworkin does not believe that we are governed by lists,
such as lists of constitutional rights or lists of historical statutes. Instead,
we are governed by principles and ideals. Judges are not constrained
merely by explicit textual barriers, but by reasoned argument, criticism,
and example.48
To combat Dworkin's arguments, originalists maintain that judges
would not have to use their own philosophy to interpret abstract clauses
if they simply followed the original intention, for they could enforce the
choices made long ago.4 9 But determining the Framers' intent requires
the very substantive choices originalists try to avoid. An originalist must
make a substantive judgment as to what was the Framers' intent.' ° As
Dworkin aptly noted, "[t]he flight from substance must end in
substance."'"
C. Cases
The above dispute between originalists and fundamental rights theorists has taken place in numerous Supreme Court cases. 2 An early fo43. See Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 7, at 383.
44. See id at 392.
45. See id at 393.
46. See id
47. See id at 394.
48. See id; see also Sullivan, Foreword,supra note 12, at 58 (defining "standards" as a
legal directive that gives the decision-maker more discretion in reaching a conclusion).
49. See Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469, 470 (1981)
[hereinafter Dworkin, Forum of Principle].
50. See Dworkin, Bork's Jurisprudence,supra note 36, at 666.
51. Dworkin, Forum of Principle,supra note 49, at 516.
52. See eg., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992) (abortion); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(contraception); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (contraception); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (bodily integrity); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386 (1798)
(property rights).
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rum for the debate was the eighteenth century case of Calder v. Bull."
Justice Chase, an early fundamental rights theorist, argued that the people created the Constitution "to establish justice, to promote the general
welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty; and to protect the persons and
property from violence." 5 4 He further argued that "[t]here are certain
vital principles in our free Republican governments, which will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative
power."55 Referring to "abuse[s] of legislative power" and "principles of
Republican government," Chase foreshadowed the fundamental rights
theory.56
In contrast, Justice Iredell, an early originalist, condemned any use of
value judgments or natural law. "If ...Legislature[s] ...shall pass a
law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the Court
cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment,
contrary to the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice
are regulated by no fixed standard... ,"I Many contemporary originalist arguments echo Iredell's above language. He preached deference to
legislatures and the elimination of Justices' personal values in constitutional interpretation.
Because Iredell's arguments are repeated by
modern originalists, as are Chase's by contemporary fundamental rights
theorists, Calder foreshadowed the current constitutional controversy.
While the originalist/fundamental rights debate began in Calder, Griswold v. Connecticut5 9 established the competing positions for our time.
Griswold concerned a married couple's challenge to a Connecticut statute
that barred the use of contraceptives. Concurring in Griswold, Justice
Harlan best presented the fundamental rights position. He asserted that
the existence of a right is not dependent on one of the express provisions
of the Bill of Rights, for the Due Process Clause "stands ...on its own
bottom."'6 In other words, courts can derive rights from the clause itself
without relying on other specific constitutional provisions for support.
Despite apparently inviting Justices to discover rights, Harlan favored
judicial self-restraint. He believed that one key tool for such restraint
6
was a "solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.", 1
Therefore, Harlan argued adamantly against "artificial" and "largely illusory" restrictions on the Due Process Clause-one of the goals he believed originalists sought to attain.6 2
On the other side, Justice Black, as displayed in his Griswold dissent,
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

3 U.S. (Dall) 386 (1798).
Id. at 388 (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
See supra Part I.B.
Id. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring).
See supra note 10.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 501.
See id. at 502.
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was a fervent originalist. He argued that the Court must uphold the
Connecticut statute because there were no constitutional provisions that
explicitly forbade a law that might abridge privacy rights.63 This view
sprang from the belief that deriving rights from the Due Process Clause
allowed Justices wrongfully to interpose their own views where the Constitution had not spoken and where therefore the legislature's views
should control. 6 Invoking the ghost of Lochner,6" Black warned that
the proper way to keep the Constitution "in tune with the times" is
through amendment or legislative process.66 Like his forerunner Iredell,
Black urged judicial deference to legislatures and disregard of judges'
personal values in interpreting constitutional provisions.
This brief description of the two competing theories sets the stage for a
comparison of Justice Scalia's and Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence. Initially these Justices had similar theories of constitutional interpretation,
but now they apparently have diverged into competing theoretical
camps-at least temporarily.
II.

JUSTICE SCALIA VERSUS JUSTICE O'CONNOR

A.

Justice Scalia67

It is not difficult to determine Justice Scalia's position in the originalist
versus fundamental rights debate. Scalia is an originalist. He has remained faithful to this philosophy since his confirmation. In Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,68 he reaffirmed the steadfastness of his beliefs. A
63. See id at 508 (Black, J., dissenting).
64. See id, at 512.

65. Many scholars view the fear of substantive due process as a fear of repeating the
mistakes of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court used substantive due process to protect economic rights. The Court struck down laws regulating
maximum work hours as an unconstitutional restriction on the freedom of contract. It is
among the most infamous decisions in the Court's history because the Court overstepped
its bounds to invalidate an important statute. See Bork, supra note 16, at 44; Ely, supra
note 34, at 14-15.
66. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 522.

67. Antonin Scalia had a rapid assent to the highest echelon of the legal community.
After graduating first in his class from Georgetown University, he graduated magna cum
laude from Harvard Law School where he was Note Editor of the Law Review. He was
an associate at the law firm of Jones, Day, Cockley & Reavis in Cleveland before joining
the faculty of the University of Virginia in 1967. He worked in high level positions in the
federal executive branch and at the Department of Justice and was a professor at the
University of Chicago from 1977 until 1987. He later served for several years as editor of
the American Institute's Regulation magazine. President Reagan appointed him to the
D.C. Court of Appeals in 1982. For background information, see 13 Roy M. Mersky &
J. Myron Jacobstein, The Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings and Reports on
Successful and Unsuccessful Nominations of Supreme Court Justices by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 1916-1986, at 124 [hereinafter Scalia Hearings]; M. David Gelfand

& Keith Werhan, Federalism and Separation of Powers on a "Conservative" Court:
Currents and Cross-Currentsfrom Justices O'Connor and Scalia, 64 Tul. L Rev. 1443,

1446-47 n.10-13 (1990); David Boling, Comment, The JurisprudentialApproach of

Justice Antonin Scalia Methodology over Result?, 44 Ark. L. Rev. 1143, 1146 (1991).

68. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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brief analysis of Scalia's substantive due process theory, from his confirmation hearing testimony through his Casey opinion, will highlight the
key distinctions from Justice O'Connor's theory.
1. Justice Scalia the Originalist
Justice Scalia's confirmation hearings did not reveal anything startling
about his constitutional theory. Though he maintained that he did not
have a "fully framed omnibus view of the Constitution, ' 69 he admitted
an inclination toward the "original meaning" interpretation as opposed
to a living Constitution.7 0 This view arose from his belief that the original meaning offered protection "against the passions of the moment that
may cause individual liberties to be disregarded."7 1
His writings have confirmed that he did indeed abide by a particular
theory. In a frequently cited article, Scalia evaluated two competing theories: originalism and "nonoriginalism" (his name for the fundamental
rights theory).7 2
Discussing nonoriginalism, Justice Scalia initially noted that several
"prominent and respected commentators reject the original meaning...
as an authoritative guide."7 3 Scalia, however, rejected these commentators' arguments and attacked nonoriginalism. According to Scalia, the
main theoretical defect with nonoriginalism is its incompatibility with
the principles that justify judicial review.7 4 Central to this justification,
first enunciated in Marbury v. Madison,7 5 is the idea that the Constitution
is "an enactment that has a fixed meaning."'7 6 In other words, Scalia
argued, only under an originalist view does the Constitution have meaning.7 7 Without this meaning, Scalia believes that judges would not even
have the power of judicial review, eliminating the need for theories of
constitutional interpretation for the judiciary.7 8
Justice Scalia's other main critique of nonoriginalism is its lack of coherence in attempting to replace the original meaning:
If the law is to make any attempt at consistency and predictability,
surely there must be general agreement not only that judges reject one
exegetical approach (originalism), but that they adopt another. And it
69. Scalia Hearings, supra note 67, at 142.
70. The phrase "living Constitution" refers to the premise that the Constitution's
meaning should evolve with time. See Rehnquist, supra note 17, at 693-94.
71. Scalia Hearings, supra note 67, at 142-43.
72. See Scalia, supra note 29, at 851-55.
73. Id. at 853 (citing scholars such as Harvard Law professor Laurence Tribe, Stanford Law School's Dean Paul Brest, Yale professor Owen Fiss, and Oxford professor
Ronald Dworkin).

74. See id. at 854.

75. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
76. Scalia, supra note 29, at 854.
77. In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall opined that if a legislative enactment and the
Constitution conflicted, then the Constitution must win. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
at 177. For this to be true, the Constitution must have some independent meaning.
78. See Scalia, supra note 29, at 854.
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is hard to discern any emerging consensus among the nonoriginalists
as to what this might be.7 9
The tone of Scalia's discussion almost implied that he may apply a funda-

mental rights theory that distinguished itself from others. That was not
his intended message. Scalia's real criticism is that nonoriginalists apply
their own views in interpreting the Constitution. John Hart Ely similarly
criticized nonoriginalist theories as inadequate because they supplant the
judge's personal views for the actual words of the Constitution.'

Despite attacking nonoriginalism, Justice Scalia also faulted the application of originalism. One flaw, Scalia noted, is that true originalism

requires an exhaustive analysis of ancient documents and transcripts that
may be "better suited to the historian than the lawyer."'" Scalia's second

critique of originalism is that "it is medicine that seems too strong to

swallow." 2 In its pure form, originalism leads to decisions that simply
are unacceptable. Scalia's example involved the Eighth Amendment.
While flogging may not have been "cruel and unusual" punishment in

the eighteenth century, it surely is today. A statute allowing flogging
would certainly be struck down, even by a Scalia-oriented, originalist
Court.
Although Justice Scalia finds fault with originalism, he is able to justify it in the end. Scalia resolves the conflict between nonoriginalism and
"strong-medicine" originalism by labeling himself a "faint-hearted"

originalist8 3 According to Scalia, the faint-hearted originalist posits an
evolutionary intent to the text of the Constitution."

Also, Scalia chooses

originalism as his method of interpretation because it is most compatible

with his notion of a democratic system. 5 Elections, rather than judicial
interpretation of a "living Constitution," insure that the laws keep pace
with current values.
79. Id at 855.

80.
81.
82.
83.

See Ely, supra note 34, at 43-72.
Scalia, supra note 29, at 857.
Id at 861.
See id at 864.

84. See id

85. See id The CincinnatiLaw Review article also reveals Scalia's conception of democracy, which in turn affects his constitutional theory. He wrote that originalism is
"more compatible with the nature and purpose of a Constitution in a democratic system." Id at 862. He does not explain his conception of democracy, but apparently believes our system is a representative democracy. See infra note 124 for a discussion of
representative democracy. Under this theory, the will of the people is supreme. Therefore, deference to legislatures, an originalist mantra, is vital because it upholds this vision
of democracy.
Contrast this view with the fundamental rights view of democracy. This view conceives our system as a constitutional democracy. See infra note 208 for a discussion of
constitutional democracy. Under this theory, there are certain rights and liberties that
are beyond the scope of the legislative process because they are so fundamental. Therefore, the Court may protect these certain rights despite a legislative enactment against
them. Understanding this distinction is crucial to understanding the competing theories
of constitutional interpretation.
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Justice Scalia's final justification is that, between the two approaches,
86
originalism would lead to more moderate results than nonoriginalism.

He argues that it is "the lesser evil" for judges to err on the side of history than to create law based on personal predilection.87 Making this
value judgment, Scalia believes that judges must choose originalism as
their constitutional theory.
2.

Justice Scalia's Originalism

Justice Scalia has expounded his originalism in several opinions. Particularly when discussing unenumerated fundamental rights derived from
the Due Process Clause, Scalia passionately argues against expansion of
recognized substantive due process rights. His theory has three main elements: tradition as historical practices, rights defined at their most specific identifiable levels, and deference to legislatures.
a.

Tradition

The first element of Justice Scalia's theory is his use of tradition as
historical practices. Scalia described this aspect of his theory in a foot-

note in Michael H. v. Gerald D.88 In Michael H., an adulterous father

based his claim of a right to visit his child on the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Rejecting this claim, Scalia defined tradition. His source of tradition is history as it is recorded in law books;
Scalia analyzed specific state law as it existed when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified.8 9 His approach is positivistic or legal as op-

posed to normative or sociological-tradition is simply what laws existed, not what people thought about the substantive right, at the time of
the amendment. 90
Justice Scalia's use of tradition as historical practices is not part of his

originalism. Rather, attempting to deal with and limit previous substan86. See Scalia, supra note 29, at 864.
87. See id.
88. 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). The issue in Michael H. was whether an unwed
biological father had a constitutional right, under the Due Process Clause, to visit his
child despite a California statute that legally presumed the mother's husband to be the
biological father.
Scalia also discussed his theory in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
For a critique of Scalia's use of tradition, see L. Benjamin Young, Justice Scalia'sHistory
and Tradition: The ChiefNightmare in Professor Tribe's Anxiety Closet, 78 Va. L. Rev.
581 (1991).
89. See Michael H, 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
90. See id. at 122 n.2; cf James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Webster and the
Future of Substantive Due Process, 28 Duq. L. Rev. 271, 281-82 (1990) (discussing
Scalia's reliance on an historical/traditional value test); Young, supra note 88, at 583 n. 14
(arguing that Scalia's use of specific rather than general traditions derives from his espousal of originalism, and his belief that judges should not allow personal values intrude
in law making); Gregory C. Cook, Note, Footnote 6: JusticeScalia'sAttempt to Impose a
Rule of Law on Substantive Due Process, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 853, 863-66 (1991)
(suggesting that Scalia believes that the Court should look either to text or to evidence of
specific traditions, as opposed to general traditions).
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rive due process cases, he uses tradition as "damage control."'" If he
could, Scalia likely would overrule past substantive due process decisions.92 Attempting to limit further recognition of substantive due process rights, Scalia demands that historical traditions exist before
recognizing due process rights.
In Michael H.,9 Justice Scalia supported his use of tradition by referring to two cases in the unenumerated rights field: Bowers v. Hardwick I
and Roe v. Wade. 95 The Bowers Court justified its rejection of a right to
homosexual sodomy by noting the great number of states that had criminal sodomy laws when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. 96 Referring to past state laws, the Bowers Court added credibility to Scalia's
subsequent use of tradition as history. Also in Bowers, the Court defined
fundamental liberties as those rights" 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' "
Equating tradition with history, this formulation
greatly supported Scalia's use of tradition as historical practices. Scalia
found further support for his use of tradition with language from Roe.98
There, the Court went to great lengths to negate the proposition that the
nation had a historical tradition against abortion. 99 Citing Roe, Scalia
apparently argued that, by merely discussing history, the Court justified
his approach.
Justice Scalia recently explained how he uses tradition in Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey.°0 There, Scalia used both originalism and tradition
to reject a fundamental right to abortion, noting that "(1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about [abortion], and (2) the longstanding
traditions of American society have permitted [abortion] to be legally
proscribed."10°1 Additionally, Scalia attacked the joint opinion's interpretation that he limits rights to those historically recognized. He argued
that liberty is not limited to its historical meaning, as the joint opinion
charged. Rather, the Court simply must not ignore history when deter02
mining the existence of a right.1
Justice Scalia's clarification actually reinforced the position that he
91. For this term I am indebted to Professor James E. Fleming, Fordham University
School of Law.
92. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (granting the substantive due process
right to abortion). For example, for Justice Scalia, precedents that grant substantive due
process rights are not a source of tradition. See Sullivan, Foreword,supra note 12, at 114.

93. 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
94. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
95. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

96. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
194 (1986)).
97. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977)).
98. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
99. See id.(citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-41 (1973)).
100. 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
101. Id at 2874 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
102. See iL
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would recognize only those rights that states have previously protected.

He reiterated that the Court "may not disregard" a specific relevant tradition concerning the right in question.103 For Scalia, this apparently
means that the Court may not recognize a right if states have legislated
against the specific right in the past." °

As this explanation suggests,

Scalia wrongfully believes that his theory allows an evolution of rights. 10
Once states have rejected a right, Scalia would bar it from ever being
recognized.1 0 6 By logically following his theory, Scalia could only recog-

nize a new right by manipulating his definition of the relevant history."0 7
If Justice Scalia defines tradition as historical practices, then he could

not justify decisions such as Griswold v. Connecticut108 or Eisenstadt v.
Baird."° Both cases dealt with a right to use contraceptives. Using the

Connecticut statute at issue in Griswold as evidence, states historically
did legislate against the use of contraceptives. In order to support these

decisions, Scalia responded in Michael H. that those cases did not deal

with a "still extant" tradition.' 10 Because the statute was no longer en-

forced, no relevant tradition still existed. Therefore, the Court could find
a fundamental right to use contraceptives.

That explanation, however, may conflict with Justice Scalia's stance on
homosexual sodomy. Though statutes criminalizing sodomy exist today,

they are rarely enforced. Yet Scalia cites Bowers v. Hardwick II to justify his theory. 1 2 Scalia's position would be more consistent if he argued
that Griswold was wrongly decided and asserted that all fundamental
rights should be limited to historical1 3practices that existed when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.'

b. Level of Generality
The level of generality in which the Court frames the controverted
right is the second major aspect of Justice Scalia's originalism. The level
of generality determines how broadly or narrowly the Court frames a
particular right." 4 Scalia staunchly supports a narrow framing and
103. See id.

104. In Michael H., Scalia noted that for a liberty to be fundamental, there must not
have been laws enacted against the interest. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
122 n.2 (1989). This definition excludes many, if not all, of the unenumerated fundamental rights most desired today, most notably abortion and homosexual sodomy.
105. See Scalia, supra note 29, at 864.
106. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 n.2.
107. But see Cook, supra note 90, at 883-84.
108. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
109. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
110. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989).
111. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (using historical practices to deny a fundamental right to
homosexual sodomy).
112. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
113. Bork, someone who does claim that Griswold was wrongly decided, rejects
Scalia's use of tradition in Michael H. See Bork, supra note 16, at 235-40. Instead, Bork
would adhere to the original understanding of the relevant amendment. See id.
114. For example, the right recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479

1993]

O'CONNOR AND SCALIA

claims that the Court should analyze a potential right at "the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection
to, the asserted right can be identified." ' By analyzing the right at its
most specific level, the Court avoids arbitrary decision making.1 1 6 For
instance, in Michael H., both Justices O'Connor and Brennan appealed
to tradition, but they reached different results because the Justices did
not uniformly define the tradition on which they relied. 1 7 To create uniformity, and 1a18law of rules, the Court must identify the right at its most
specific level.

Analyzing the most specific tradition in MichaelH., Justice Scalia confronted Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Michael H. There,
O'Connor rejected Scalia's reliance on the most specific tradition because
she felt it conflicted with prior cases and she did not want to be constrained by such a narrow approach.1 1 9 Scalia rebutted O'Connor, noting that the cases which she cited as not being based on the most specific
tradition, were distinguishable.12 In those cases, the Court did not reject
a still existing tradition, but a dead one.1 2 Because the relevant tradition
was no longer followed, the Court had no obligation to recognize it.122
Therefore, the cases were not inconsistent with the most specific tradition
approach.
In Casey, Justice Scalia continued analyzing issues at the most specific
level possible. He framed the issue as whether "the power of a woman to
abort her unborn child . . . is a liberty protected by the Constitution
.... "123 Applying this element of his theory, Scalia did not even address
a general right to privacy.
The level of generality element of Justice Scalia's theory enables him to
address rights that can be easily dismissed through an originalist interpretation. By defining the right at issue narrowly, Scalia can reject the
right for lack of specific constitutional support, without dealing with
broader, more difficult, issues.
(1965), can be framed broadly as a general right to privacy or narrowly as the right to use
contraception in the marital relationship in the marital bedroom.
115. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 128 n.6. For example, in MichaelH., Scalia argues that
the most specific tradition is not the rights of fathers generally, as Justice Brennan asserts
in dissent, but the rights of an adulterous natural father. See aL
116. See id
117. See id

118. For a critique of Scalia's position, see Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf,
Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1057 (1990). For a

discussion of Scalia's desire for rules of law, see infra Part III.C.
119. See MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120. See id. at 128 n.6 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
121. See id
122. See id

123. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2874 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
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c. Deference to Legislatures
The final element of Justice Scalia's theory is deference to legislatures.
This deference derives from his conception of our democracy as a representative democracy 124 and is part of classic originalism."'
Justice Scalia revealed his conception of democracy in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.'2 6 Scalia believed that Webster was a failure
because the Court did not extricate itself from an area-abortion-in
which it did not belong.1 27 He argued that abortion was a political, not a
judicial, issue so the Court had no business resolving it. Therefore, the
Webster Court should have overruled Roe v. Wade' 2 because the Roe
decision represented a judicially created fundamental right in a political
area.' 2 9 If a fundamental right, defined at its most specific level, did not
historically exist as a state law, or is not enumerated elsewhere in the
Constitution, then legislatures, not the Court, must determine whether to
recognize the right. 30
Likewise in Casey, Justice Scalia sternly argued that it was not the
Court's role to determine the outcome of the abortion debate. There, his
primary complaint with the joint opinion was its discussion and application of "reasoned judgment."'' The joint opinion used the term to capture Justice Harlan's approach to substantive due process. To Harlan,
reasoned judgment is the required process necessary to reach lasting and
sound decisions.132 To Scalia, reasoned judgment is nothing more than a
means to ignore the text and tradition of the Constitution by deciding
' 33
cases based on "philosophical predilection and moral intuition."'
Use of reasoned judgment conflicts with Justice Scalia's belief that
"the text of the Constitution, and our traditions, say what they say and
there is no fiddling with them."' 34 This quotation illustrates the originalist view that directly contradicts both Dworkin's view and Justice
124. A representative democrat believes that all power is vested in the people and conveyed through their votes to the legislatures. See Walter F. Murphy et al., American
Constitutional Interpretation 30-31 (1986). Unless legislation contradicts a specific constitutional provision, a representative democrat will validate it.
125. See Bork, supra note 16, at 153-55.
126. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). In Webster, the Court upheld Missouri's abortion restrictions, but refused to reconsider its holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
127. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 532; see also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should
not recognize a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, as it is a legislative issue).
128. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
129. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 532.
130. See Boling, supra note 67, at 1176.
131. For a discussion of O'Connor's use of reasoned judgment, see infra Part II.B.4.
132. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
133. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2884 (1992) (concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
134. Id. at 2883; see also Alex Kozinski, My Pizza With Nino, 12 Cardozo L. Rev.
1583, 1586 (1991) (describing Scalia's desire to defend the plain meaning of the Constitution: "Just as sure as AV's pizza means AV's pizza, confront [in the Sixth Amendment]
means confront.")

1993]

O'CONNOR AND SCALIA

O'Connor's position in the joint opinion in Casey. Scalia combatted
claims by fundamental rights theorists and O'Connor that ambiguous
portions of the Constitution demand that judges use value judgments,
arguing that ambiguous text should be clarified by "long and clear tradition." 135 The proper place for value judgments is in3 6the legislative process, not in the Court or the confirmation process.'
Justice Scalia's opinion urged the Court to "get out of this area, where
[it has] no right to be."'13 ' That urging epitomizes Scalia's theory in the
substantive due process realm. As an originalist, Scalia maintains that if
a right is not enumerated in the text, then the Court should not recognize
it as a protected liberty interest.
He further claimed that if the joint opinion were correct in stating that
protected liberties are unbounded, then the people, not the Justices,
should implement their values to determine which liberties exist. "Value
38 To bolster his
judgments ...should be voted on, not dictated ....,,1
39
view, Scalia invoked the specter of Dred Scott.' Recalling a portrait of
Chief Justice Taney,"'° he noted the Chief Justice's somber, disillusioned
look. He attributed this sorrow to the Court's attempt to legislate away
the slavery dispute. 4 ' Though Scalia cannot believe that the Casey decision may lead to as drastic a conclusion as DredScott (the Civil War), he
does believe that the Court's error is equally menacing. The struggle will
end, asserted Scalia, only when the Court withdraws from the abortion
issue, permitting legislatures to enact the people's will.' 4 2
Justice Scalia's stance exemplifies the representative democratic view
of our governmental system. Scalia insists that the Justices' personal
views should not replace the will of the people. Our system does not
grant judges the power to instill their values in law, but only the power to
protect specifically enumerated constitutional rights. To receive additional protections, citizens can create other enforceable liberties through
the legislative process.
In sum, since his confirmation, Justice Scalia has consistently preached
the originalist gospel: reverence for the text and traditions, "' deference
to legislatures, and avoidance of judicial value judgments. An analysis of
his application of this theory, however, especially compared to Justice
135. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2884 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see Lee
v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678-79 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2885 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
But see Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 7,at 392 (arguing that value judgments should be part of the confirmation process).
137. Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2885 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
138. Id
139. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
140. Taney presided over the infamous Dred Scott case which struck down the Missouri Compromise, and ordered Scott returned to slavery.
141. See Casey, 112 S. C. at 2885 (Scalia J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
142. See id
143. As previously noted, Bork does not include traditions in his originalism. See
supra note 113.
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O'Connor, creates a different overall impression of this supposedly "conservative" jurist. As Part III will explain, although politically conservative in his philosophy, his technique is activist.
B. Justice O'Connor1 "
Unlike Justice Scalia's, Justice O'Connor's constitutional theory has
evolved during her tenure on the Court. Although O'Connor began her
career as an originalist, her Casey opinion suggested a fundamental rights
element to her jurisprudence.14 5 Her opinions that address fundamental
rights derived from the Due Process Clause insinuate this shift. Her future decisions, which will be discussed in Part III, will be affected not
only by this possible shift, but also by her approach to stare decisis and
her politically conservative nature.
1. Confirmation Hearings
Justice O'Connor's state court opinions and early writings were not
highly theoretical. Thus, the first public discussion of her constitutional
theory occurred during her confirmation hearings.14 6 This lack of history led some commentators to believe that she came to the bench as an
open-minded jurist, without adherence to any particular theory, making
her a possible swing vote. 4 7 Recognizing that O'Connor's theory was
unknown, the senators on the Judiciary Committee asked her many questions that tried to pin down her theory. O'Connor's responses revealed a
leaning toward judicial restraint and originalism.
During her confirmation hearings, Justice O'Connor made several statements regarding
the Framers' intent. "In analyzing a [constitutional] question the intent
of the framers . . . is vitally important."14' 8 She further claimed that
judges should overrule cases only when they have a different interpretation of the Framers' intent. 49 Similarly, she proclaimed that proper
Fourteenth Amendment analysis revolved around the drafters' intent. 5 0
When pressed on her position on abortion, O'Connor labeled herself a
strict constructionist. Consistent with her definition of strict constructionism, she claimed that the proper role of a judge is to interpret the
law, not to make law. Therefore, her personal view on abortion had no
144. Sandra Day O'Connor graduated third in her class from Stanford University
School of Law (behind Chief Justice Rehnquist who graduated first). She worked in all
three branches of the Arizona government: as a state senator, attorney general, and
Superior Court and State Court of Appeals Judge. See Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron
Jacobstein, The Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings and Reports on Successful
and Unsuccessful Nominations of Supreme Court Justices by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 1916-1981, at 225 (Supp. 1983) [hereinafter O'Connor Hearings].
145. This analysis is limited to her substantive due process jurisprudence.
146. See O'Connor Hearings, supra note 144, at 196-97, 220.
147. See Carl R. Schenker, Jr., "Reading" JusticeSandra Day O'Connor,31 Cath. U.
L. Rev. 487, 490 (1982).
148. O'Connor Hearings, supra note 144, at 196.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 197.
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place in the resolution of the legal issue. 15 Also, she declared that her
judicial philosophy was one of judicial restraint. 52 She believed that Justices should decide cases on the most narrow grounds possible, and
should apply rational relationship scrutiny 5 3 to most legislative actions
unless dealing with a "special" right or discriminatory legislation."
Additionally, she revealed her deference to legislatures, proclaiming that
abortion is a "valid subject for legislative action" because abortion is a
public policy
issue, and it is not the Court's role to create public
55
policy.'
Justice O'Connor did not claim that unenumerated fundamental rights
were nonexistent. O'Connor recognized a right to privacy as established
in Griswold v. Connecticut.' 6 She stated that people "have certain other
rights that are not enumerated."' 5 7 This recognition was not inconsistent with her apparent slant toward originalism. Rather, she accepted
these rights more as precedent than as personal belief. Moreover, all current Justices recognize the existence of some unenumerated rights, making it difficult to align O'Connor's recognition with a particular theory.
2.

Early Years on the Court

Justice O'Connor's early years on the Court generally proceeded according to expectations.' 8 Her opinions stressed the facts of each case
while avoiding policy arguments, and she was reluctant to invalidate legislative measures. 159 Not surprisingly, the Justice with whom she most
frequently agreed was Rehnquist.'" In addition to restraint, her early
fundamental 6 rights opinions encompassed all the elements of
originalism.1 1
The opinion that most clearly revealed Justice O'Connor's early preference for originalism was her dissent in Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health. 6 2 That opinion demonstrated O'Connor's theoretical
approach toward fundamental rights claims at that stage of her career.
151. See id.at 210.
152. See id.at 220.
153. Applying rational relationship scrutiny, a Justice will uphold a statute if the government has any legitimate basis for enacting the statute, and if there is a rational connection between the legislative act and the desired end. See Murphy et al., supra note 124, at
836-37. Compare this test to strict scrutiny which requires a compelling governmental
interest and a narrowly tailored connection between the legislative measure and the desired governmental end. Further there must be no other way for the government to protect the compelling interest. See id.at 689.
154. See O'Connor Hearings, supra note 144, at 232.
155. Id. at 218.
156. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
157. O'Connor Hearings, supra note 144, at 284.
158. See Riggs, supra note 9,at 43.
159. See id at 33, 43.
160. See id at 15.

161. See Richard A.Cordray & James T. Vradelis, Comment, The EmergingJurisprudence ofJustice O'Connor, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 389, 458 (1985).

162. 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In this opinion, O'Connor, joined
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In the first paragraph of the dissent, Justice O'Connor stated that the
majority failed to use sound constitutional theory and failed to decide the
case "based on the application of neutral principles."' 6 3 O'Connor discussed neutral principles as an originalist,'" arguing that such principles
1 65
should be both grounded in the community and consistent over time.
She maintained that, by applying neutral principles, Justices avoid allowing their own view to color their decisions.
O'Connor continued this theme in the second paragraph of the dissent,
displaying another originalist notion: Justices should not allow their personal views to affect their interpretation. "Irrespective of what we may
believe is wise or prudent policy... 'the Constitution does not constitute
us as "Platonic Guardians" nor does it vest in this Court the authority to
strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable
social policy'....,,166 This quotation reaffirmed O'Connor's statements
during her confirmation hearings. She did not believe that Justices
should have any role in creating social policy. 1 7 Such a role rests solely
with legislatures.
Justice O'Connor expanded on the legislature's role in fundamental
rights issues later in her opinion when she defined the undue burden
test.168 O'Connor stated that a democratic society demands that legislatures resolve controversies over extremely sensitive issues. "We should
not forget that 'legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and
welfare of the people' ....,,161 Deference to legislatures is a major tenet
of originalist theory. 7 ' In Akron, O'Connor preached and practiced this
deference.' 7 ' For the above reasons, Justice O'Connor's Akron dissent
by Justices White and Rehnquist (the two Roe dissenters), attacked the majority opinion
that reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
163. Akron, 462 U.S. at 452.
164. Though Bork uses this term to support originalism, see Bork, supra note 16, at
146, John Hart Ely has associated the term with the fundamental rights theory. See Ely,
supra note 34, at 54-55.
165. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 458.
166. Id. at 453 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 (1982) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)).
167. See O'Connor Hearings, supra note 144, at 206, 210, 218.
168. The undue burden test determines when a state statute impermissibly hinders a
woman's right to abortion. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2820
(1992); Akron, 462 U.S. at 463. Courts have not uniformly applied the test and other
Justices have heavily criticized it. See, e.g., Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2876-80 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (criticizing undue burden test).
169. Akron, 462 U.S. at 465 (quoting Missouri, Kan. and Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194
U.S. 267, 270 (1904)).
170. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
171. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 465. Elaborating on her fundamental rights jurisprudence,
O'Connor argued that the Court should apply rational basis scrutiny to state statutes
unless they unduly burden the fundamental right. See Thornburgh v. American College
of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986). Also noteworthy is O'Connor's discussion of
stare decisis. She states that the doctrine is not as rigidly enforced in constitutional cases.
When the Court is convinced of previous error, it is not constrained to follow precedent.
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showed her tendency toward originalism in the substantive due process
area.
Joining the majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick,' 2 Justice
O'Connor maintained her narrow view of due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. While the Bowers Court accepted other substantive due process holdings which did not derive from specific enumerations in the Constitution, 11 3 it saw no justification for extending these
holdings to protect homosexual sodomy.17 4 One basis for its holding was
that, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but five of the
thirty-seven states in the Union outlawed sodomy."7 5 By using this reference, the Court followed both the originalist goal of finding the drafters'
intent, 176 and accorded with Justice Scalia's use of tradition as historical
practices.1 7 7 The Court also adopted an originalist stance toward the establishment of substantive rights using the Due Process Clause:
[W]e [are not] inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority
to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process
Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitior
macy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little178
no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.
By joining this opinion, instead of distancing herself from originalist reasoning in a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor accepted the Court's
use of tradition and the drafters' intent.
3.

Evolution

Akron and Bowers displayed Justice O'Connor's early jurisprudence, as
she fervently stuck to the originalist view of Fourteenth Amendment. As
her years on the Court advanced, however, she created her own position
on substantive due process issues. Though she primarily remained an
originalist, frequently deferring to legislatures, she often wrote concurring opinions, noting her theoretical differences with other originalist
views.
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 7 9 Justice O'Connor distinguished her
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence from Justice Scalia by focusing on
Scalia's practice of identifying rights at their most specific level. In his
See Akmn, 462 U.S. at 458. Contrast this discussion with O'Connor's lengthy discussion
of stare decisis in Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808-16.
172. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Court in Bowers refused to recognize a fundamental
right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy.
173. See id. at 190 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
174. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92.
175. See id. at 192-93 & n.6.
176. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
178. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.

179. 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989).
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plurality opinion, Scalia inserted footnote six, describing his constitutional theory for analyzing fundamental rights claims. 8 O'Connor concurred in all of the opinion except footnote six. She disagreed with
Scalia's approach because it "sketche[d] a mode of historical analysis to
be used when identifying liberty interests protected by the Due Process
Clause ...that may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions
.... ,"I1 O'Connor reached this conclusion because the Court had previously protected rights not framed at their most specific levels."8 2 Furthermore, limiting analysis to an examination of history would
improperly limit future results." 3 Citing Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe
v. Ullman,184 she then stated that she would not "foreclose the unanticipated" by limiting interpretation of the Due Process Clause to a particular historical analysis.'
Though she did not offer her own mode of
interpretation, she possibly foreshadowed Casey, where she again cited
1 86
Harlan's dissent in Poe.
The rift between Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia widened with
87
O'Connor's concurrence in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.1
O'Connor's concurrence is consistent with her characterization as an
"individualized" decision-maker or a "contextualist."' 8 8 Ruling like a
contextualist, O'Connor based her conclusion on the facts of the case,
and thus made no mention of any underlying constitutional theory concerning a right to abortion. She supported her narrow opinion with the
traditional principle that Justices should avoid answering constitutional
questions unless it is absolutely necessary.' 9
Consistent with that principle, Justice O'Connor argued that reconsideration of Roe should occur only "[w]hen the constitutional invalidity of
a State's abortion statute actually turns on the constitutional validity of
Roe v. Wade."' 9 ° In refusing to reexamine Roe, O'Connor did not forgo
originalist theory; her decision ultimately validated the abortion regulations at issue. 9' She simply emphasized one particular element of
originalism--deference to legislatures. It seems that O'Connor's individ180. See id. at 127 n.6; for discussion of Scalia's jurisprudence, see supra Part II.A.
181. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).

182. See id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
183. See id.
184. 367 U.S. 497, 542, 544 (1961).
185. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132.
186. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2804-06 (1992).
187. 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
188. See Gelfand & Werhan, supra note 67, at 1468; Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and
the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 543, 604 (1986). In

fact, most commentators have not labeled O'Connor as either an originalist or a fundamental rights theorist precisely because of her individualized decision making. However,
analyzing her decisions in a specific area, such as unenumerated fundamental rights derived from the Due Process Clause, enables such a categorization.
189. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 525-26.

190. Id. at 526. But see Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2803-04 (reviewing the Roe decision).
191. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 522-23.
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ualized decision-making method is simply a means to uphold legislative
enactments.

Although she generally agreed with Justice Scalia, in that she consistently upheld statutes that denied recognition of fundamental rights, her
break with Scalia was over how aggressively to apply originalism. While
Scalia addressed the broad constitutional issue, attempting to align it
with originalism, O'Connor avoided analysis of constitutional issues and
simply deferred to legislatures until it was absolutely necessary to determine if a fundamental right existed under the Due Process Clause. 92
Justice O'Connor's rift with Justice Scalia over substantive due process
was further illustrated in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health.'9 3 In a concurring opinion, O'Connor argued that if the liberty

guaranteed by the Due Process Clause protected anything, it must protect the "deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment."'"
There, O'Connor supported her view by discussing past Court decisions
that used the Due Process Clause to bar "state incursions into the
body."19' 5 This holding differed sharply from Scalia's. He urged that the
Court had no business determining whether a person has a right to die
because this was a legislative issue.' 9 6
There are two possible explanations for Justice O'Connor's concurrence. One possibility is that, specifically discussing the liberty interest at

stake, her concurrence may have foreshadowed her break from originalism in Casey. Alternatively, her recognition of a right to refuse medical

treatment perhaps exemplified faint-hearted originalism.' 9 7 The latter
explanation seems more probable in light of a speech O'Connor delivered
near the time of the Cruzan decision.' 9 In the speech, she argued that
Supreme Court Justices must avoid unjustified constitutional decision
making. 19 9 To emphasize her point she conjured up memories of Dred
Scott,' noting the dire ramifications when the Court interferes with
political issues that deeply divide the nation.201 Thus, as of Cruzan,
192. Before Casey, commentators generally believed that O'Connor would reject a fundamental right to abortion, but saw enough obscurity in O'Connor's theory to hedge their
remarks. See Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics." Writingfor an
Audience of One, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 119, 149-50 (1989); Bopp & Coleson, supra note 90,
at 276-77; Christopher A. Crain, Note, JudicialRestraint and the Non-Decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 263, 316-17 (1990).
193. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The fundamental rights issue addressed in Cruzan, broadly
stated, was whether there is a fundamental right to die. A narrower possible conception
of the right is the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.
194. Id at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
195. Id at 287 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
196. See id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
197. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
198. See Sandra Day O'Connor, The JudiciaryAct of 1789 and the American Judicial
Tradition, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1 (1990).
199. See id. at 9. By "unjustified" O'Connor means imposition of personal values.
200. See id at 5 (citing Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)).
201. See id at 9.
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O'Connor may still have held originalist beliefs in the area of substantive
due process.
4. Planned Parenthood v. Casey

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,2 "2 Justice O'Connor apparently
shifted from the originalist approach that both she and Justice Scalia ad-

vocated. Instead, O'Connor applied a fundamental rights approach to
substantive due process, arguing that the word "liberty" protected certain rights despite the absence of a specific constitutional reference to

that right.
In section II of the Casey joint opinion, Justice O'Connor rejected two
factors crucial to Justice Scalia: deference to legislatures and tradition as

historical practices.2 °3 Disagreeing with Scalia, O'Connor noted that a
potential right to abortion derived from the word liberty in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2" She dismissed a pure
originalist interpretation of the clause, noting that a purely textual reading suggested only a procedural meaning. The Court, however, had long
interpreted the clause to have a substantive component as well.20 5 This

rejection of originalism signaled O'Connor's apparent shift toward a fundamental rights approach and away from the judicial restraint she had
previously preached.20 6
The Casey opinion contradicted Justice O'Connor's prior statements
on fundamental rights issues. In her opinions over the last ten years,
despite growing conflict with Justice Scalia, O'Connor had consistently
deferred to legislatures in substantive due process cases.20 7 In Casey,
however, O'Connor adopted a radically different position.20 8 Arguing

that legislatures cannot deny fundamental rights, O'Connor urged that
the "guaranties of due process.., have in this country 'become bulwarks
202. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
203. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804-08 (1992). For a discussion of Scalia's theory, see supra notes 88-113 and accompanying text.
204. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
205. See id.
206. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 465 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); O'Connor Hearings, supra note 144, at 220. Of course, deference to precedent, which is another factor in her Casey opinion, is a form of judicial
restraint. This conflict is explored in Part III.
207. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 529 (1989); Akron, 462
U.S. at 453.
208. Justice O'Connor approached legislative decisions like a constitutional democrat.
A constitutional democrat believes that some rights are so fundamental that they restrain
legislatures. Though a government has power to make laws affecting most realms, certain
liberties are so fundamental that a government cannot interfere with them. See Murphy
et al., supra note 124, at 27. Unlike a court in a representative democracy, a court in a
constitutional democracy should not automatically defer to legislatures. Instead, a court
must determine if a fundamental right is at stake. If it is, then courts must prevent the
legislature from depriving that liberty. The interests of the majority cannot suppress the
rights of the individual. See id. It is not dispositive that the fundamental right at issue is
not specifically enumerated in the Constitution. See id. at 30-31.
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This statement contradicted both
..against arbitrary legislation.' ""
Justice Scalia's current view of democracy and O'Connor's previous
view. Instead of deferring to legislative judgment, O'Connor held that
the Court must stop overzealous legislatures from infringing on
unenumerated fundamental rights that are protected by the word "liberty" in the Due Process Clause.2 10
After discussing the legislature's role, Justice O'Connor attacked the
originalist view of incorporation 2" and Justice Scalia's use of tradition.
O'Connor admitted that it was "tempting" to limit the protections encompassed by the Due Process Clause to those protected in the first eight
amendments,2 12 but "of course this Court [had] never accepted that
view." 3 Addressing Scalia, she posited that the protections of the Due
Process Clause could be limited to those that existed at the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment's adoption.2" 4 This limitation, however, would
also be "inconsistent with our law." 21 s
After dismissing Justice Scalia, Justice O'Connor discussed her own
analysis of the Due Process Clause. O'Connor's view of substantive due

process emphasized principles, not discrete rights. She argued that the
Constitution protects a realm of personal liberty from government intru-

this princision.216 For example, many other rights are protected2 1under
7
ple, despite no explicit mention in the Constitution.

The source of

209. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
210. See id. at 2804 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)). Restricting legislatures this way epitomizes constitutional democracy. Individuals have rights that legislatures cannot invade. See supra note 208.
211. Incorporation is the determination of which rights in the Bill of Rights are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and hence, applicable to the states. See Murphy et
al., supra note 124, at 98-100.
212. See Casey, 112 S. CL at 2804-05 (citing Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-92
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting)).
213. Id. at 2805.

214. See id; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
215. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805; see also Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J.,

concurring) (rejecting Scalia's reliance on past state laws and his narrow definition of the
relevant tradition).
216. As support, O'Connor cites the Ninth Amendment. She denies that Due Process
Clause protections are limited to the Bill of Rights or to specific practices in place at the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805. For
arguments that the Ninth Amendment allows judicial recognition of unenumerated rights
through the Due Process Clause, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring); The Rights Retained by the People (Randy E. Barnett ed.,
1989); Laurence H. Tribe, ContrastingConstitutional Visionr Of Real and UnrealDiffer-

ences, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 95 (1987). For arguments that judges should not derive rights from the Ninth Amendment. see Thomas B. McAffee, The OriginalMeaning
of the Ninth Amendment, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1215 (1990); Bork,supra note 16, at 178-85.

217. See Casey, 112 S. CL at 2805. O'Connor noted the Court's recognition of a right
to marriage, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), contraception, see Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977), and general privacy, see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965). Scalia would not similarly frame the rights
recognized in these cases. For example, he might argue that the right protected in Gris-
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O'Connor's principled approach is Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman.21 O'Connor quoted Harlan's discussion of tradition:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot
be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is
that through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the
balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands
of organized society .... The balance of which I speak is the balance
struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which
it broke. That tradition is a living thing.2 19
Again quoting Justice Harlan, Justice O'Connor emphasized a flexible,
principled understanding of due process which is associated with fundamental rights theorists. "'[L]iberty is not a series of isolated points ....
It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.' "220
Applying Harlan's theory, O'Connor argued that "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life."' 22 To resolve fundamental rights questions, O'Connor held, the Court must "exercise that
same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned
judgment. ' 22 2 O'Connor's use of tradition and interpretation of the Due
Process Clause, as adopted from Harlan, radically differs from Justice
Scalia's approach. Scalia's historical use of tradition is narrow and limiting. In contrast, O'Connor's principled use of tradition is broad and
open-ended.
Like Justice O'Connor and Justice Harlan, other Justices have adopted
a principled approach to tradition. For instance, Justice Cardozo discussed rights "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental. ' 22 3 Chief Justice Warren held to higher
scrutiny classifications based on race because they were "contrary to our
traditions and hence constitutionally suspect. '224 Justice Powell protected the sanctity of the family because the institution of family "is
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. '225 None of these
uses of tradition relied on historical practices. If one did, then its use
would contradict the decision of the case. For example, our nation had a
wold is the right to use contraception in the marital relationship, not a more general right
to privacy. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
218. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

219. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting))

(emphasis added).
220. Id. at 2805 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
221. Id. at 2807.
222. Id. at 2806.
223. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
224. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
225. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
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history of the practice of slavery, yet Warren used "tradition" to mean
the ideal of racial equality. Contrasting Scalia's use of tradition as historical practices, these Justices used the word "tradition" as aspirational
principles." 6 The crucial inquiry, therefore, is not historical, but principled. Relying on moral principle instead of historical practices, Justices
must analyze what our tradition should have been, not what it was.
Justice O'Connor's argument is notable for its use of Justice Harlan's
language and its adoption of a fundamental rights theory. The terms she
used contradict originalist theory-a theory she previously supported.
In place of the text, the Framers' intent, or deference to legislatures,
O'Connor emphasized liberty on a rational continuum, tradition as a living thing, and reasoned judgment. O'Connor's use of tradition allows
Justices flexibility in recognizing rights. By acknowledging the use of
reasoned judgment when interpreting the Due Process Clause, O'Connor
invoked the fundamental rights approach to constitutional
interpretation.' 7
Thus, Casey marks an important shift in Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence with respect to substantive due process. She has apparently abandoned her originalist approach to Fourteenth Amendment rights and
replaced it with a fundamental rights theory." 8 She remains, however, a
politically conservative jurist.329 For this reason, her recognition of a
fundamental right to abortion may have resulted merely from a strict
application of stare decisis. The next section will compare how Justices
Scalia and O'Connor apply their theories, analyzing the role of precedent
and suggesting the implications of their split.
III. THEORY VERSUS PRECEDENT
Before Casey, commentators noted "subtle" differences between Justices Scalia and O'Connor, yet both were considered strong members of
the Court's conservative bloc.2 30 The Casey decision "astounded many
observers" as it evidenced a dramatic and unexpected theoretical shift by
the three authors of the joint opinion."' One can no longer describe the
226. For this comparison I am indebted to Professor James E. Fleming, Fordham University School of Law.
227. Commenting on Casey, Ronald Dworkin noted that the joint opinion authors, in
adopting Harlan's view, have understood the Constitution not to be a list of discrete rules
but a "charter of principle." See Dworkin, Center Holds, supra note 3, at 31. But this
conception of the nature of the Constitution does not entail a particular substantive theory. This fact explains how Harlan, O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy-political conservatives--can adopt this general constitutional theory, at the same time that Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens can hold another version of it. See id at 32.
228. See infra Part III.

229. There is no evidence that O'Connor's Casey opinion represents a change in her
political beliefs against abortion. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806
(1992) ("Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision.").
230. See Gelfand & Werhan, supra note 67, at 1443.
231. See Dworkin, Center Holds, supra note 3, at 29.
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difference between Scalia and O'Connor as "subtle." It is not clear, however, whether their differences primarily resulted from different uses of

theory or different uses of precedent.
Part II discussed the theoretical break between the Justices. Part III

will focus on the Justices' contrasting approaches to precedent and decision-making, suggesting the practical implications of their differences.

First, this Section will compare Justices Scalia and O'Connor to two Justices who similarly conflicted in the past, Black and Harlan. Second, this

Section will analyze two distinctions between Scalia and O'Connor: their

use of precedent and their formulas for case analysis. 2 32 While the previous Section described the theories themselves, these comparisons suggest
how each Justice will apply their theories to actual cases. Finally, this
Section will examine the implications of the Justices' theories by forecasting how each Justice may rule on upcoming fundamental rights issues.
A.

Restraint and Activism Through Justices Harlan and Black

Justices Harlan and Black vigorously debated the derivation of
unenumerated rights from the Due Process Clause.2 33 The current constitutional conflict between Justices O'Connor and Scalia harks back to
this debate. The similarities between these debates shed light on the potential results of future fundamental rights disputes.
1. Justices Scalia and Black
Justice Scalia's position parallels Justice Black's stance in the latter's
ongoing debate with Justice Harlan. Though Black fervently abided by
the conservative theory of originalism,23 4 he is famous as a political liberal,2 35 while Scalia is an ardent political conservative. Aside from their
political differences, Black and Scalia have some similar traits. Like
232. A third notable distinction between these Justices involves the masculine and feminine perspectives of constitutional interpretation. Suzanna Sherry describes the competing characteristics of these approaches. Feminine jurisprudence emphasizes connection,
subjectivity, and responsibility. See Sherry, supra note 188, at 580. Conversely, the masculine perspective emphasizes autonomy, objectivity, and rights. See id.
After describing these perspectives, Sherry analyzes O'Connor's jurisprudence, arguing
that it contains feminine characteristics, most notably contextualism. See id. at 592-613.
O'Connor's jurisprudence, on the whole, does reveal feminine, communal aspects. Focusing solely on unenumerated fundamental rights, however, O'Connor's theory may
drive her decision more than communal aspects. Constitutional theory better explains
her apparent shift on abortion and other individual rights than does feminist theory.
233. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring);
id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of their positions, see supra Part I.C.
234. Originalism is a conservative theory in the way it limits interpretation of the Constitution to the text and original intent.
235. See, e.g., David P. Bryden & E. Christine Flaherty, The 'Human Resumes" of
Great Supreme CourtJustices, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 635, 660-61 (1991) (noting Black's liberal
activism); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Judicial Philosophies in Collision: Justice Blackmun,
Garcia, and the Tenth Amendment, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 749, 751 (1990) (discussing Black's
originalism and judicial activism).
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Black, Scalia adopted a conservative theory. Also like Black, Scalia is
activist in the way he attacks precedent." 6 Despite their contrasting
political ideologies, these similarities intimate how Scalia may treat future fundamental rights issues.
2.

Justices O'Connor and Harlan

Justice O'Connor's stance parallels Justice Harlan's position in his
ongoing debate with Justice Black over substantive due process. Though
Harlan adopted a theory based on general principles," 7 he is a legendary
political conservative.23 O'Connor has explicitly adopted Harlan's principled approach toward protecting fundamental rights through the Due
Process Clause.2 39 Also, like Harlan, she is traditionally known as a
political conservative. 2'
The importance of this comparison is in its predictive value-it indicates how Justice O'Connor may apply her principled theory. The fundamental rights theory allows judges to use their own principles in
interpreting the Constitution. Thus, judges can reach both liberal and
conservative results, depending on their personal philosophy. Justice
Harlan used this theory to support politically conservative conclusions.24 1 Likewise O'Connor, because she holds conservative principles,
will likely use the principled theory of fundamental rights, normally associated with liberal causes, to reach politically conservative results.
This conclusion was illustrated when, despite recognizing the fundamental right to abortion in Casey,24 2 the joint opinion upheld several politically conservative restrictions upon the fundamental right. 243 Placing
these restrictions indicates that, even if she recognizes other fundamental
rights, she may allow conservative restrictions to stand.
B.

Counter-Revolutionary Conservative v. Preservative Conservative 2'

The most important difference between Justices Scalia and O'Connor
is their contrasting attitudes toward precedent and the application of
236. See Boling, supra note 67, at 1197-99.
237. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
238. See, ,,g., Vincent Blasi, Six Conservatives in Search of the FirstAmendment The
Revealing Case of Nude Dancing, 33 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 611, 624 (1992) (calling
Harlan "the quintessential judicial conservative"); Susan R. Martyn & Henry I.
Bourguigon, Coming to Terms with Deathv The Cruzan Case, 42 Hastings LJ. 817, 847
(1991) (labeling Harlan "most everyone's definition of conservative").
239. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803-07 (1992).
240. See Cordray & Vradelis, supra note 161, at 458.
241. See, eg., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552-53 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(claiming that a state can properly prohibit homosexuality, "however privately
practiced").
242. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
243. See id at 2822, 2826, 2832.
244. For this formulation I thank Professor James E. Fleming, Fordham University
School of Law.
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their theories. While Scalia, like Justice Black, aggressively tries to revamp the case law to reflect his originalist theory, O'Connor often subordinates her theory to stare decisis. Scalia ignores precedent to further his
goal of reversing the "Warren Court revolution"2'4 5 and past substantive
due process decisions.246 O'Connor, though maintaining her conservative views, judges within the framework her predecessors established; her
goal is to reach conservative results, but not at the expense of precedent.
These differing attitudes toward stare decisis suggest how they will apply
their theories in future cases.
1. Justice Scalia the Counter-Revolutionary
Describing Justice Scalia as a counter-revolutionary Justice seems contrary to his originalist philosophy. How can he be counter-revolutionary
when he bases his theory on historical practices? The answer is that
Scalia consistently attacks established law, attempting to implement his
originalist objectives. While he respects the history that state statutes
and the Constitution created, precedent is history that is framed merely
by another judge, thereby not worthy of the same respect. 247 The term
counter-revolutionary, then, describes his attitude toward precedent
which he interprets as revolting against originalism. While it is true that
his theory relies on history, prior decisions are not the positivistic history
to which he refers. Scalia's relevant history is embodied in the text of the
Constitution or state law, so he reverses precedent to reach his originalist
goal of limiting rights to these positivistic traditions.
Though Justice Scalia attacks precedent in several fields, 248 his
counter-revolutionary attitude may be strongest in the substantive due
process area. This area is particularly anathema to Scalia because the
rights involved do not derive from an explicit law of rules. 249 He is not
content to rule within the judicial framework established in past
245. The "Warren revolution" is the judicial activism and liberal decision-making that
occurred during Earl Warren's tenure as Chief Justice. Ironically, the case that most
concerns current conservative Justices, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was decided by
the Burger Court.
246. One commentator described the "conservative counterrevolution" as an attempt
to fulfill the goal of Republican Presidents, dating back to Richard M. Nixon, to reverse
the Court's direction. See Linda Greenhouse, Liberal Giants Inspire Three Centrist Jus-

tices, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1992, at 1.
247. See Sullivan, Foreword,supra note 12, at 74, 114.
248. See, ag., Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (1991) (holding that severe,
mandatory sentencing is not cruel and unusual in constitutional sense and overruling
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)); Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2613 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing against restrictions on "victim impact" evidence in death
penalty cases and overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)); Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 92 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that promotions, transfers, and recalls based on political party membership do not violate First Amendment
and asking the Court to overrule Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) and Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980)).
249. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989), for evidence of Scalia's
desire for a solid law of rules as opposed to balancing tests.
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unenumerated fundamental rights cases. Therefore, he uses his theory to
attack precedents as wrongly decided.
During his confirmation hearings, Justice Scalia hinted at his eagerness
to correct precedent that he thought wrong. Discussing his view of precedent, Scalia revealed that his decision whether to overrule precedent
would be based in part on how woven the "mistake" was into the fabric
of the law.2 0 A key factor in making this determination would be how
long the precedent has existed. For example, he noted that almost no
revelation could induce him to overrule Marbury v. Madison," but he
would be more willing to overrule a less established case, such as Roe v.
Wade. 5 2 While one would expect a nominee to show the utmost respect
for past Court decisions, Scalia was rather bold in distinguishing precedents he would respect from those he would overrule.3 Though he
claimed not to have his "mind made up either way,"'-2 it appears that he
had.
Justice Scalia's attitude toward precedent while on the Court confirms
these observations. He has aggressively attempted to alter the law by
weaving his theory into opinions wherever possible." s Webster best displayed this aggressiveness. There, Justice O'Connor refused to overrule
expressly Roe because the statute did not directly contradict that holding. Attempting to seize the opportunity, Scalia mocked the majority's
opinion and O'Connor's concurrence for avoiding the issue.' 6 Scalia did
not have the patience to wait for the proper case to attack a precedent
with which he disagreed. Rather, he urged the Court to deal with the
underlying issue to clarify the law. 57 This urgency to paint the law with
broad originalist strokes exemplifies his counter-revolutionary style of
adjudication.
2.

Justice O'Connor as Preservative Conservative

Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice O'Connor has abided by the long-standing doctrine of stare decisis without compromising her values.
250. Scalia Hearings, supra note 67, at 132.

251. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
252. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Scalia Hearings, supra note 67, at 132.
253. See Scalia Hearings, supra note 67, at 131-32, 139.
254. Id at 132.

255. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2874 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (describing his interpretation of the word "liberty"

in the Due Process Clause); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 534-35
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing reasons to overrule Roe); Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (outlining his approach toward unenumerated fundamental rights).
256. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that O'Connor's assertion "cannot be taken seriously").
257. Some commentators supported Scalia's approach, despite the fact that it seems to
contradict the valid judicial policy, stated by O'Connor, that the Court should resolve
disputes in the narrowest terms possible. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 90, at 272;
Crain, supra note 192, at 295-96.
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O'Connor's theory works within the system, instead of attacking it.
Even while espousing originalist theory, she did not aggressively apply it.
For example, in Akron, she did not argue that the Court should overrule
Roe. Instead, she simply noted that her theory could not support a portion of the decision, the trimester framework. 25 8 Despite showing her
most fervent support of originalism, she stopped short of outright dismissal of Roe that Scalia surely would have supported. Webster is another
example of her preservative nature; she refused to analyze the statute
involved on constitutional grounds when it was not necessary.25 9
This support for precedent culminated in Casey, where she squarely
upheld the essential holding of Roe.2 ° She did this despite discarding
the trimester framework 26 1 and allowing several limitations on the fundamental right to abortion.26 2 Thus, regardless of O'Connor's possible theoretical shift, she carefully used precedent to support her position.
Further displaying a preservative attitude toward precedent, Justice
O'Connor rarely addresses theory by itself, she carefully grounds each
belief in a prior opinion.2 63 O'Connor's goal is to reach her conservative
objectives while simultaneously preserving prior Court decisions.
These competing attitudes toward precedent will affect how these Justices rule in future fundamental rights cases. Applying his counter-revolutionary style, Justice Scalia will ignore or distinguish precedent that
inhibits his goals of originalism. He is determined to remove the Court's
influence from unenumerated fundamental rights issues. Conversely,
Justice O'Connor will preserve precedent. Though she will generally follow her conservative roots, she will uphold prior decisions in reaching
her conclusions. Thus, although they have similar political goals, they
have conflicting approaches to achieving them.
C.

Balancing versus Law of Rules

Another difference between the Justices that suggests how they may
rule on fundamental rights issues is found in their divergent analytical
styles in particular cases. While Justice O'Connor prefers a balancing
approach, 2" Justice Scalia demands that the Court establish a law of
258. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453-54 (1983).
259. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 525-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
260. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992).
261. See id. at 2818.
262. See id. at 2822, 2826, 2832 (medical emergency definition, informed consent requirement, parental notification).
263. See, eg., id. at 2805-06 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting)); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 525-26 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)); Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
264. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-LiberalJudging: The Roles of Categorizationand
Balancing, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 293, 304 (1992) [hereinafter Sullivan, Post-LiberalJudging]; Sullivan, Foreword, supra note 12, at 79.
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1. Justice Scalia's Law of Rules
Unlike Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia believes that there are several
reasons for the Court to reject a balancing approach for a law of rules.
First, Justices must give the appearance of equal treatment.2 66 The best
way to accomplish this goal is to establish general rules that can be applied in many situations. Second, a law of rules serves the goals of uniformity and predictability.2 6 7 Reaching uniform decisions creates an
appearance of justice and fairness in Court decisions. Third, uniform
decisions allow people to predict how the Court will rule, enabling people
to adapt their behavior accordingly. Balancing cannot achieve either of
these two goals.26 8 Fourth, the law of rules approach may give judges
the courage to protect individual liberties. Scalia reasons that judges
may have to confront a majority when protecting rights, such as the
rights of criminal defendants. The existence of an established rule can
embolden the judge, supporting his decision to protect unpopular
rights.2 69 Finally, the rule approach avoids judge-made law3. 0 As discussed, judge-made law is anathema to Scalia. He carefully forms his
jurisprudence to avoid this insupportable occurrence. General rules inhibit judges from arbitrarily creating new rights. Conversely, balancing
allows judges to rule haphazardly, relying on personal predilection. 27 '
Justice Scalia's scorn for balancing is consistent with his constitutional
theory and intimates how he will rule in fundamental rights cases. He
will not recognize rights that are not enumerated in the Constitution, no
matter what the merits of the individual case. Originalism is Scalia's law
of rules for analyzing unenumerated fundamental rights.
2.

Justice O'Connor's Balancing

Opposing Justice Scalia's law of rules approach, Justice O'Connor primarily has favored a balancing approach, deciding cases on their individual merits rather than with hard and fast rules.27 2 Though traditionally
balancing usually resulted in a finding against rights,27 this is not neces265. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175,
1187 (1989).
266. See id at 1178.
267. See id at 1179.
268. See id at 1179-80.

269. See id. at 1180. Scalia is not referring to unenumerated rights.
270. See id at 1179.

271. See iL at 1179-80.
272. See Sherry, supra note 188, at 604. For a case example of O'Connor rejecting a
law of rules approach in favor of balancing, see Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting the majority's use of a "single categorical rule" in interpreting free exercise precedents).
273. See United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Sullivan, Post-LiberalJudging,
supra note 264, at 294.
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sarily the case today.2 74 According to Kathleen Sullivan, a given Justice's substantive political theory will affect how the Justice uses
balancing.2 75 A liberal political theory will balance and find in favor of
individual rights, while a conservative political theory will balance and
deny individual rights.
Before Casey, because Justice O'Connor's political and constitutional
theories were conservative, it followed that she used her balancing approach mostly to deny rights.2 76 Her possible adoption of a principled
constitutional theory may confuse her jurisprudence. By adopting and
refining the undue burden standard, O'Connor remained a balancer in
Casey. Her recognition of a fundamental right to abortion, however, suggests that she may balance in favor of rights in the future. Applying her
balancing approach, O'Connor will likely allow limits on constitutional
rights derived from the Due Process Clause. Her possible shift will depend on the fundamental right involved. Instead of ignoring the underlying right, as she did inAkron, she may recognize the right and allow only
limited restrictions, as she arguably did in Casey. Her theory, then, affects her jurisprudence in the substantive due process area by increasing
the possibility that she will recognize underlying individual rights.
Thus, while Justice Scalia's law of rules approach will lead him uniformly to deny unenumerated fundamental rights, Justice O'Connor's
balancing enables her to find rights, at least in part.
D. Application
Applying these distinctions to pending unenumerated fundamental
rights cases provides context for the Justices' competing theories and
their implications for future decisions. Recent abortion rulings and potential homosexual rights cases provide the examples for this discussion.
1. The Abortion Issue
In a recently decided case, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic,27 7 the Court held that Federal judges cannot use the Civil Rights
Act of 1871,278 also know as the Ku Klux Klan Act, to prohibit protesters from blocking abortion clinics. Justice Scalia wrote the majority
opinion, while Justice O'Connor was one of three dissenters.
274. See Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging, supra note 264, at 307-09. Sullivan reveals
four permutations that show balancers reaching both liberal (pro-rights) and conservative
(anti-rights) results.
275. See id. at 304. Others argue that a Justice's general constitutional theory will
determine his use of balancing. See Mark V. Tushnet, Does ConstitutionalTheory Matter?: A Comment, 65 Tex. L. Rev 777, 783-85 (1987).
276. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting fundamental right to abortion); Akron v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (rejecting
fundamental right to abortion).
277. No. 90-985, 1993 WL 3819 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1993).
278. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
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While the case focused on an equal protection question-whether opposition to abortion in effect discriminates against women 7 9-- Scalia
briefly discussed the right to abortion. A proper section 1985(3) action
bars conspiracies that deprive rights which are protected against both
private and public interference.2"' While the Court has stated that the
right to travel is such a right,2 ' Scalia argues that the right to abortion is
not.28 2 Deriving either from a general right to privacy or as a protected
liberty in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
right to abortion
is "obviously not protected against private
2 3
infringement.,

Justice O'Connor did not use this case as an opportunity to discuss her
abortion theory. In fact, she explicitly stated that "[tihis case is not
about abortion." 284 Some thought it possible that since O'Connor
banned the government from depriving women of the fundamental right
to abortion, then she may also ban private parties from denying the same
right.28 5 Instead, she ruled on an equal protection basis, claiming women
were an affected class.28 6
O'Connor's lasting view on abortion may have been revealed, however,
when she voted with the majority in denying certiorari for a case that
involved a stringent abortion statute. 2 7 This act implies that O'Connor
will keep her fundamental rights theory intact, at least for abortion.
2.

Homosexual Rights

Aside from abortion, homosexual rights is another unenumerated fundamental right that is receiving public attention. In light of recent legislation against homosexuals,28 8 the Court is likely to hear a homosexual
rights case soon. The current theories of Justices Scalia and O'Connor
hint at the likely outcome of such a case.
The Court has issued a written opinion once before on whether a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy exists. 9 In Bowers, the Court
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See Bray, 1993 WL 3819, at * 5.
See id at *7.
See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 n.17 (1966).
See Bray, 1993 WL 3819, at *7.
Iad
Id at *43.

285. See Marcia Coyle, The New Term, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 5, 1992, at 1, 28-29.
286. See Bray, 1993 WL 3819, at *40.

287. See Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obst. & Gyn., 113 S. Ct 633 (1992), denying cert. to
962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1992).
288. The November 1992 election included two states, Oregon and Colorado, that had
ordinances that dealt with homosexuality on the ballot. The Oregon ordinance, which
was more explicitly anti-homosexual, failed to pass. In Colorado, Amendment 2, which
repealed laws in Aspen, Denver, and Boulder that prohibited discrimination to homosexuals, passed. Gay rights activists have sued the state, challenging the amendment's constitutionality. See Court Challenge Begins on Colorado Anti-Gay Referendum, Reuters,

Jan. 11, 1993, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. Gay rights groups feel that
Amendment 2's passage may spur similar voter initiatives in other states. See id.
289. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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rejected its existence as a fundamental right, thereby upholding a Georgia statute that criminalized consensual sodomy. 290 In reaching its decision, the Court applied originalist logic, claiming that neither the text of
the Constitution, nor our nation's historical practices regarding homosexual sodomy, permit a finding of such a fundamental right derived
from the Due Process Clause.291 The Court recognized past substantive
due process decisions 292 but rejected any extension from those precedents. 293 Though Scalia was not on the Bowers Court, it is clear how he
would vote if the Court revisits the issue. Although O'Connor was a
member of the Bowers majority, she may analyze a similar case differently today.
Justice Scalia's originalist theory would lead him to reject a fundamental right to homosexual association or homosexual sodomy. Viewing tradition as historical practices, Scalia would argue that a specific
identifiable tradition exists in regard to homosexuality; namely, states
outlawed it throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. Therefore, Scalia would not derive such a right from the Due Process Clause. Critics of Scalia would point to the more recent tradition of
states dropping their homosexual sodomy statutes.294 Scalia would likely
counter that this shift is not a reason to recognize a constitutional right,
but is simply the legislative process functioning properly.
Furthermore, Justice Scalia would define the right as narrowly as possible. The right would not be a general right to decisional or spacial
privacy. 295 It would be a right to homosexual association or a right to
engage in homosexual sodomy. Narrowing the definition, Scalia could
more easily dismiss the potential right.
Justice Scalia's deference to legislatures would further inhibit him
from finding a fundamental right to homosexual association. If a state
passed a statute that limited homosexual's rights, like the Colorado statute296 arguably does, he would uphold it as exclusively within the legislature's power to pass such an act. In a representative democracy, the will
of the majority is supreme. As a representative democrat, Scalia will not
recognize a constitutional right which invalidates a statute where the
right did not historically exist.
Conversely, Justice O'Connor may reach different conclusions if a homosexual association case came to the Court. Though O'Connor joined
290. See id. at 192.
291. See id. at 191-93.
292. See id. at 190 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v.
Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
293. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
294. See id. at 193-94.
295. See id. at 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
296. See supra note 288.
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the Bowers majority, further reflection is necessary in light of her possible
jurisprudential shift. The Bowers majority interpreted the word "tradition" to mean historical practices. In Casey, O'Connor rejects that use of
tradition.29 7 She would likely reject tradition's use as historical practices
in a homosexual association case as well. Using tradition as a "living
thing," O'Connor may recognize a right to homosexual association or
homosexual sodomy. Anti-sodomy statutes do not reflect current national principles and our nation's attitude toward homosexuality has certainly changed since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.29 It is
vital to remember, however, that O'Connor remains a political conservative. She adopted her theory from Harlan, and Harlan explicitly rejected
recognition of a fundamental right to homosexual association.2 99 Therefore, her notion of a living tradition may be limited to Harlan's
boundaries.
On the one hand, recognition of such a right would fit with what may
be Justice O'Connor's current view of democracy. A constitutional democrat3 " ° would not simply defer to the legislature's judgment, as the Bowers Court did, but would challenge the statute for impinging on a
fundamental right. Constitutional democrats are not limited to the text
in recognizing fundamental rights.3"' On the other hand, while she recognized a fundamental right to abortion in Casey,3°2 this does not necessarily mean she would find a right to homosexual association. This does
mean that she will not eliminate the possibility simply because no such
right is explicitly enumerated in the text. If she has become a constitutional democrat, she may recognize such a right.
Justice O'Connor's preservative attitude toward precedent also causes
conflict in determining whether she would recognize a fundamental right
to homosexual association. If she defines the right broadly, she could
justify it as part of the line of privacy cases. 3 Conversely, Bowers established a precedent that denied a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy. Applying stare decisis strictly, as she did in Casey,3°4 O'Connor
may reject the right as failing to meet the factors established in Casey." 5
297. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992).
298. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-94.
299. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 547, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
300. See supra note 208.

301. See Murphy et al., supra note 124, at 29.
302. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992).
303. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479

(1965).

304. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808-16.
305. In Casey, the joint opinion discussed four factors to consider as part of its stare
decisis analysis: whether the rule of the past case has been unworkable; whether there has
been substantial reliance on the rule; whether the law's growth has caused society to
discount the rule; and whether facts have sufficiently changed to leave the rule irrelevant
or unjustifiable. See id at 2809. Applying Bowers to these factors, there has been a lack
of societal reliance on that decision. An argument can also be made that, with increased
awareness about homosexuality, facts have sufficiently changed to make the Bowers ruling
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While Scalia certainly would not recognize a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy, it is difficult to determine which way O'Connor would go
when faced with such a decision today.
There are three possible options as to how Justice O'Connor will apply
her Casey arguments in future fundamental rights cases, such as a homosexual rights case.3 °6 One option is that Justice O'Connor's ruling in
Casey was strictly illustrative of her preservative conservative nature.
Perhaps she did not want to be "the vote" that overruled Roe. As the
only woman Justice, Justice O'Connor may have been uncomfortable depriving women of the right to abortion. Following this logic, she quoted
theoretical language as a fundamental rights theorist only to support her
decision, not to adopt the theory as her own. This option would also
explain her rigid application of stare decisis in Casey. Under this scenario, she would reject a fundamental right to homosexual association, and
reject a due process challenge to the Colorado statute.
A second option is that Justice O'Connor has adopted Harlan's substantive due process jurisprudence. This theory, however, has a strong
politically conservative bias. Harlan explicitly rejected homosexual
rights.3 °7 If this is O'Connor's goal, then she would also reject a right to
homosexual association and a due process attack to the Colorado statute.
A final option is that Justice O'Connor has adopted Harlan's jurisprudence, but will apply it with her own guidelines. Much has changed
since Harlan wrote in his Poe dissent in 1961. It is possible that even he
would apply his theory differently today. Adopting this option, Justice
O'Connor would likely recognize additional fundamental rights, with
limitations. Under this scenario, she may recognize a fundamental right
to homosexual association, thereby holding that the Colorado statute violates homosexuals' due process rights.
Any of the aforementioned options would rationally follow from her
Casey opinion. Future decisions will reveal which path Justice O'Connor
takes.
unjustifiable. However, as a preservative conservative, if O'Connor accepts Bowers at all,
then she would uphold it.
306. These options assume that O'Connor analyzes such a case under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There are other options as to how O'Connor
could analyze Colorado's Amendment 2. For example, she could reject a due process
argument, thereby upholding Bowers, but strike down the ordinance on equal protection
grounds, stating that Amendment 2 violates homosexuals right to equal treatment under
the law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
O'Connor's inclination to protect the independent mechanisms of state government
may also affect her decision. See Cordray & Vradelis, supra note 161, at 423. As the
amendment was enacted through an election, and appears to be the will of the majority,
O'Connor may simply assert that this is a state issue. Thus, absent a constitutional violation, she would argue that the Court should not interfere. See Washington v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 488 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting, O'Connor, J., joining).
307. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 547, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION

Though Justices Scalia and O'Connor have evolved into competing
theoretical camps, their positions on specific issues may not conflict forever. Apparently, by explicitly recognizing the fundamental right to
abortion in Casey, Justice O'Connor has made a theoretical shift. However, the joint opinion in Casey severely curtailed that right by permitting
many state restrictions. Her use of the fundamental rights theory in a
conservative manner leaves the future murky. It is also unclear how Jushis8 theory, and his attack on precetice Scalia's aggressive application of 30
dent will affect the rest of the Court.
While Justice Scalia will probably forever limit fundamental rights to
those explicitly found in the text of the Constitution or the historical
practices of our nation, Justice O'Connor's position is unclear. The theory of fundamental rights allows her to interpret the abstract clauses of
the Constitution, such as the Due Process Clause, according to principles
she recognizes as worthy of constitutional protection. It is likely, however, that she will apply the theory to recognize rights, albeit with limitations. Whatever her decision, this Note has suggested the key factors to
watch in interpreting how Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia reach
their conclusions and how these factors are likely to affect future fundamental rights cases.
308. One commentator has compared Justice Scalia's self-aggrandizing attitude to former Justice Frankfurter. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Leaderof the Opposition, New Republic,
Jan. 18, 1993, at 20, 27. In noting his own intellectual abilities (Scalia reportedly has
asked law clerks "'What's a smart guy like me doing in a place like this?'" Id.), Scalia
may be unaware of his displacement as the intellectual leader of the Court. This may
isolate him from the rest of the Court, leaving him to disseminate increasingly bitter
dissents. See id

